The SEC's emphasis on the use of plain English in disclosures is designed to make them more readable and more informative. Using an experiment, I find that more readable disclosures lead to stronger reactions from small investors, so that changes in investors' valuation judgments are more positive when news is good and more negative when news is bad. This result holds even though I investigate a setting where readability does not affect the actual amount of information that investors acquire from a disclosure. Drawing on research in psychology to explain this result, I predict and find that processing fluency from a more readable disclosure acts as a heuristic cue and increases investors' beliefs that they can rely on the information in the disclosure. Counter to my expectations, I do not find that more readable disclosures directly increase perceptions of management credibility. Finally, I find that investors predict that managers will provide less readable disclosures when news is bad than when news is good, consistent with claims made in prior literature that managers strategically obfuscate bad news. However, investors do not appear to spontaneously consider this possibility unless they are explicitly made aware of the potential for variation in disclosure readability. Additional analysis suggests that the stronger reactions of investors in response to more readable disclosures may be unintentional, consistent with prior research on processing fluency.
I. Introduction
The Securities and Exchange Commission has placed increasing emphasis on providing clear and readable financial disclosures. The Plain English Rule (421(d)), passed in 1998, requires that issuers adhere to plain English principles in the design of firm prospectuses. The rule is accompanied by a Plain English Handbook (SEC 1998 ) that provides both linguistic and formatting suggestions for preparing plain English disclosures and encourages firms to adopt the suggestions in all of their communications (SEC 1998).
Technological advances in computational linguistics have allowed researchers to more easily investigate the impact of plain English rules on disclosure readability, and the impact of readability on investor behavior. Loughran and McDonald (2010) demonstrate that firms' 10-Ks become more compliant with plain English guidelines following the release of Rule 421(d). Loughran and McDonald (2010) and Miller (2010) both show that more readable 10-Ks are associated with higher trading volume among small investors. However, Miller (2010) finds that the effects of plain English are subsumed by 10-K length. Because these two papers use different measures of readability, different methods of capturing "small investors," and investigate different time periods, it is difficult to compare their results directly and conclude whether the readability associated with plain English language and formatting affects investors. I use an experiment to hold disclosure length and total information constant, and isolate the effects of disclosure readability on investors' reactions to both good and bad news. I focus on small investors in my study, both to be consistent with prior archival literature (Miller 2010; Loughran and McDonald 2010) and also because of the SEC's assertion that clear writing is primarily intended to assist the "least-sophisticated investors" (SEC 1998) .
Prior studies also do not make clear why readability affects investors. Investor behavior and readability may both be driven by an omitted variable. For example, Li (2008) uses text analysis to show that firms provide longer and less readable disclosures when they report losses and transitory gains than when they report persistent income. Investors may therefore be reacting to firm performance rather than to disclosure readability. Bloomfield (2008) provides a lengthy list of reasons why disclosure readability may be associated with financial performance; each provides a potential explanation for investor behavior.
Even if investors are responding primarily to readability, archival studies provide little evidence on the mechanism for the response. For example, less readable disclosures may limit investors' ability or willingness to acquire information (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Bloomfield 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003) . I explore an additional possibility, which is that processing fluency from a more readable disclosure increases investors' beliefs that they can rely on the information in the disclosure. Processing fluency is an individual's subjective feeling about how easy it is for them to process information. Because individuals assume that feelings experienced while thinking about a target bear on the target itself, positive feelings of processing fluency are treated by individuals as a heuristic cue that information can be relied upon in making related judgments (Shah and Oppenheimer 2007; Hafner and Stapel 2010) . My experiment allows me to capture measures of processing fluency and disclosure reliance that are not directly observable in archival data, and to provide some preliminary evidence on the intentionality of investors' reactions.
Research on processing fluency also suggests that a fluent message can lead to more favorable evaluations of the messenger (Oppenheimer 2006) . This implies that more readable disclosures may increase investors' perceptions of management credibility, regardless of whether a disclosure conveys good or bad news. My experiment allows me to isolate judgments about the manager from judgments about the firm, and to tie my research to the larger literature in accounting on the determinants of management credibility.
Finally, archival studies provide little evidence on investors' perceptions of managers' strategic choice of disclosure readability. Li (2008) suggests that managers intentionally increase disclosure complexity when performance is poor, in order to obfuscate information and mitigate the market's reaction. The use of an experiment allows me to make salient the potential for variation in disclosure readability, in order to investigate whether investors believe that managers are likely to engage in strategic obfuscation of bad news.
In Stage 1 of my experiment I present 234 participants with background information on a fictitious soft drink company and ask them to provide initial valuation judgments. Participants then receive a press release about the financial performance of the firm. Between-subjects manipulations alter the readability of the press release and whether the press release presents good or bad news. For the manipulation of readability, I vary characteristics of the press release so that they violate (less readable condition) or conform to (more readable condition) linguistic and formatting suggestions outlined in the SEC's Plain English Handbook (SEC 1998) . After reading the release, participants provide a revised judgment on the appropriate valuation of the firm. Participants also provide judgments about the extent to which they believe that they can rely on the information in the disclosure, their feelings about processing fluency, and their perceptions of management credibility.
The difference between the revised and initial valuation judgments serves as a measure of the strength of investors' reactions to the press release containing my manipulations.
As predicted by theories of processing fluency, I find that more readable disclosures lead to stronger reactions from participants. Changes in participants' valuation judgments in response to a more readable disclosure are more positive when news is good and more negative when news is bad.
These results arise despite the fact that, in my setting, variation in readability does not lead to detectable differences in the number of recall questions that participants answer correctly about the information in the press release. This suggests that my results are not driven by differences in the amount of information that participants acquire. Instead, greater readability increases participants' reliance on the information in the press release. Mediation analysis confirms that participants' reliance on the release is driven by increased processing fluency (i.e. participants' personal feelings about disclosure readability, or processing ease). I do not find that more readable press releases directly increase participants' judgments about the credibility of management.
Stage 2 of my experiment is designed to investigate investors' perceptions of managers' strategic choices of disclosure readability. In Stage 2, I present participants with the press release that they were initially shown, as well as an additional press release from the other readability condition (still containing only good or bad news). The press releases are presented side-by-side to facilitate their comparison. Providing access to press releases at both levels of readability makes salient the fact that managers have a choice when it comes to disclosure readability. I ask participants which version of the press release they believe management would be more likely to provide, given the firm's performance. Participants predict that managers will provide a more readable disclosure in the good news condition than in the bad news condition.
Stage 2 of my experiment also asks participants to provide new valuation and credibility judgments for the firm, similar to those that were made in Stage 1. Analysis of Stage 2 valuation judgments shows that participants who received more readable disclosures in Stage 1 provide less extreme valuation judgments in Stage 2, to the point where the effect of readability on investors' reactions is no longer significant for either good or bad news. This suggests that the stronger reactions of participants found in Stage 1 in response to more readable disclosures may be unintentional (Kahneman and Tversky 1996; Tan, Libby, and Hunton 2002) . This is also consistent with findings in psychology showing that individuals are not influenced by processing fluency once they are aware of its source (Schwarz 2004; Alter and Oppenheimer 2009 ). However, these judgments are made after considering another potential level of disclosure readability that the firm could have provided. Thus it is also possible that the different pattern of results for investors' reactions in Stage 2 (compared to Stage 1) is driven by considerations of managers' strategic behavior rather than by correction for the effects of processing fluency.
My findings suggest that even if the readability of a disclosure does not affect individuals' ability to acquire information, the clarity with which the information is conveyed will affect readers' feelings of processing fluency, and may have important (and perhaps unintentional) consequences for related judgments and decisions. Recent archival studies investigate relatively long and complex 10-K filings, where differences in readability may be particularly likely to lead to differences in information acquisition (e.g. Li 2008; You and Zhang 2009; Miller 2010; and Loughran and McDonald 2010) . However, my results suggest that it is also important to consider the readability of shorter disclosures as well (like press releases). The results are likely to generalize beyond press releases; SEC filings and verbal (e.g., conference call) disclosures vary significantly in the ease with which they can be processed. In addition, subjective perceptions of processing fluency are likely to vary with knowledge and experience, leading to potential differences in how experienced and inexperienced individuals react to a given disclosure. My findings suggest that other parties (e.g. auditors, lenders, employees within the firm, etc.) may be influenced by characteristics affecting the processing fluency of the information presented to them. My findings also suggest that the impact of readability may depend on the skepticism of the reader. Readers who do not consider managers' discretion over the readability of their disclosures are unlikely to avoid the effects of processing fluency. This suggests that managers may indeed benefit by obfuscating negative information (consistent with Li's (2008) claims), if readers are not prompted to consider that management could have made different disclosure choices.
My study adds to the growing body of literature investigating the style of disclosures as opposed to their content. Content is the literal meaning of the information conveyed, or the concrete facts contained in a disclosure, whereas style captures the methods used to convey meaning to the audience (through, for example, optimistic vs. pessimistic tone, vividness, vocal cues, etc.).
Experiments are well-suited to studying disclosure style, but research in the area is relatively sparse.
At least one exception is Hales, Kuang and Venkataraman (2010) , which uses an experiment to investigate the effects of vivid vs. pallid language, above and beyond actual information content. Hales et al. (2010) find that investors are only sensitive to differences between vivid and pallid language when it conveys preference-inconsistent information. Future experimental research could provide additional evidence to complement the archival literature by investigating how specific stylistic choices affect investors' judgments, and how managers make stylistic choices in the first place.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background information and develops my hypotheses. Sections III and IV discuss my experiment and results, respectively. Section V concludes.
II. Background and Development of Hypotheses The Effect of Disclosure Readability on Investors
To address concerns about disclosure readability, the SEC's Plain English Rule (421(d)) went into effect on October 1 st , 1998, and requires that issuers adhere to plain English principles in the design of firm prospectuses. In July of 2010, the SEC voted unanimously to amend the Investment Advisers Act to require plain English in 1 In general, definitions of "readability" in prior literature are imprecise, given that the concept of readability has evolved primarily through the evaluation of grade-school textbooks (see Dubay 2004) . Some studies use disclosure length as a measure of readability (e.g. Li 2008; You and Zhang 2009, Miller 2010) . Other studies have used measures like the Fog Index or Flesch Reading Ease Score (both of which calculate readability based on sentence length and syllable counts). However, Brennan, Guillamon-Saorin and Pierce (2009) argue for more precise measures of readability in business communications. Findings from Loughran and McDonald (2010) Form ADV Part 2, the narrative brochure that SEC-registered investment advisers are required to provide to current and prospective clients.
In its Plain English Handbook, the SEC outlines a number of practical linguistic and formatting suggestions for preparing plain English disclosures (SEC 1998) . Both linguistic and formatting choices can affect the extent to which investors find a disclosure to be readable. Linguistic suggestions relate to the choice of words and how they are organized. Formatting suggestions relate to the use of features like bullet points, tables and line spacing, which increase the legibility of a disclosure (see Appendix A for examples).
There is evidence in the archival literature to support the idea that disclosure readability affects investors. You and Zhang (2009) show that market underreaction to 10-K filings is more severe as the length of the report (and presumably its complexity) increases. Miller (2010) and Loughran and McDonald (2010) use linguistic suggestions in the Plain English Handbook to develop measures of 10-K readability, and provide evidence on the relationship between enhanced readability of 10-K disclosures and the trading behavior of small investors. Miller (2010) finds that more readable disclosures are associated with greater trading activity among small investors (defined as those with trades below $5000) around the 10-K filing date. This holds even after controlling for information content, firm performance and earnings persistence. Miller (2010) also finds that 10-K complexity reduces consensus among small investors, but not large investors (defined as those with trades above $50,000).
Using a different sample period and different measures, Loughran and McDonald (2010) find that improved 10-K readability after the implementation of the Plain English Rule is associated with an increased proportion of trading by small investors (defined as those with trades of less than 100 shares). Furthermore, readability is positively associated with increased seasoned-equity issuance and better corporate governance, suggesting that more shareholder-friendly firms improve their disclosure readability.
It is possible that the trading volume of small investors is affected by disclosure readability because a less readable disclosure limits the amount of information that they extract (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Bloomfield 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003; Hodge, Kennedy and Maines 2004) .
However, research in the psychology literature on processing fluency suggests that even if less readable disclosures do not limit investors' ability to acquire information in the first place, disclosure readability can still affect investors' judgments and decisions. More specifically, enhanced processing fluency from a more readable disclosure may increase investors' perceptions that they can rely on the information in the disclosure.
The Role of Processing Fluency
Processing fluency is subjective, and represents how easy it feels to process information.
Prior research has manipulated processing fluency in a variety of ways. For example, studies have altered visual processing fluency by manipulating whether materials are presented in a difficult-or easy-to-read font (e.g. Haettenschweiler vs. Cambria) or by manipulating font size and color (see, e.g. Novemsky, Dhar, Schwarz and Simonson 2007) . Other studies have manipulated linguistic processing fluency through, for example, rhyming (McGlone and Tofighbakhsh 2000) , the use of easy-or hard-to-pronounce words (Alter and Oppenheimer 2006) or the use of simple vs. complex synonyms (Oppenheimer 2006) .
Despite the range of techniques that have been used to manipulate processing fluency, the corresponding responses from individuals are remarkably similar across different settings. In general, individuals like messages that feel easy to process. Because individuals assume that feelings experienced while thinking about a target bear on the target itself, the feelings of subjective ease associated with processing fluency are typically treated as a cue that something about the message or messenger is good. 4 Processing fluency has been associated with higher ratings of truth, preference for the message and the messenger, willingness to rely on information, and confidence in judgments (see Alter and Oppenheimer 2009 for a review). For example, McGlone and Tofighbakhsh (2000) find that individuals experience higher processing fluency and judge truthfulness to be higher with rhyming aphorisms than with informationally-equivalent non-rhyming aphorisms (e.g. "What sobriety conceals, alcohol reveals" vs. "What sobriety conceals, alcohol unmasks"). Alter and Oppenheimer (2006) find that, in the short term, stocks with names and ticker codes that are easier to pronounce outperform those that are more difficult to pronounce.
With respect to disclosure readability and processing fluency, the Plain English Handbook suggests that readability affects processing ease by arguing that its plain English suggestions correspond with how individuals naturally process information (SEC 1998) . Greater readability in a disclosure should therefore increase feelings of processing fluency and increase investors' beliefs that they can rely on the disclosure. Consistent with this prediction, Shah and Oppenheimer (2007) find that when both more and less fluent information is presented, individuals weight the more fluent information more heavily in their judgments. Similarly, Hafner and Stapel (2010) argue that processing fluency increases positive feelings which then serve as a cue regarding the usability of the information.
If investors increase their reliance on disclosures that are more readable, then more readable disclosures should also lead to stronger reactions to the news contained in those disclosures. While both Loughran and McDonald (2010) and Miller (2010) find positive associations between disclosure 4 However there are some exceptions, supporting the notion that the meaning of processing fluency can be affected by context (Schwarz 2004) . Briñol, Petty and Tormala (2006) find that greater processing fluency can lead to more negative evaluations if ease is framed negatively. Similarly, Labroo and Kim (2009) find that individuals with explicit goals evaluate objects associated with pursuing their goals more negatively when they are high in processing fluency, presumably because individuals adopt a heuristic belief that achieving something of value will require greater effort (and thus ease is viewed negatively). readability and the trading behavior of small investors, they reach differing conclusions on whether readability from the use of plain English affects small investors above and beyond the effects of 10-K length. Specifically, Loughran and McDonald (2010) conclude that readability affects investor reactions even after controlling for the length of the 10-K, whereas Miller (2010) finds that length subsumes the effects of readability from the use of plain English. Since these two papers use different measures of readability, different methods of capturing "small investors," and investigate different time periods, it is difficult to compare their results directly. Thus it is still an open question whether disclosure readability from the use of plain English affects small investors above and beyond disclosure length. Furthermore, both Miller (2010) and Loughran and McDonald (2010) look at small investors' responses to overall readability, but do not separately investigate responses to good and bad news. It is important to understand how investors react to bad news disclosures that are low in readability given prior claims that managers strategically obfuscate negative news (Li 2008) . In Stage 1 of my experiment, participants receive a single disclosure that contains either good or bad news and is either more or less readable. The use of an experiment allows me to hold disclosure length and total information constant while varying disclosure readability, thereby isolating the effects of disclosure readability on small investors' reactions to both good and bad news. Again, I measure investors' reactions by capturing how their valuation judgments change in response to more or less readable disclosures. My first hypothesis is:
H1:
More readable disclosures lead to more positive changes in investors' valuation judgments when news is good, but more negative changes when news is bad.
As discussed above, I do not expect the stronger reactions to more readable disclosures in my study to be driven by differences in the actual information acquired by investors, but instead by how processing fluency affects their belief that they can rely on the disclosure. Existing techniques in the archival literature cannot address processing fluency as a mechanism through which readability influences investors. An experiment allows me to elicit processing fluency and reliance measures that are not available in archival data. Holding disclosure length and information constant, my second hypothesis is:
H2: More readable disclosures increase investors' reliance on the information in the disclosure, and this effect operates through increased feelings of processing fluency.
Prior research also suggests that processing fluency may lead to more favorable evaluations of management, even when a disclosure conveys negative news. On one hand, and consistent with H1 and H2, processing fluency can serve as a cue to the usability of a given piece of information, so that negative information is weighted more heavily and leads to lower valuation judgments ( focuses on evaluations of management credibility, and hypothesizes that:
H3:
Investors' judgments of management credibility will be higher when news is more readable, regardless of whether the disclosure conveys good or bad news about the firm.
My experiment identifies a circumstance where processing fluency is expected to simultaneously decrease one favorability judgment (valuation when news is bad) but increase another (management credibility). However, it is also possible that fluent negative news and the resulting negative reaction predicted by H1 will carry over into negative impressions of management, leading to lower evaluations of management credibility when negative news is more readable.
To date, only a few studies in the accounting literature have relied on theories related to processing fluency. Research suggests that fluency feelings can arise from processing new, external information, but also from the ease of generating thoughts and accessing past memories (Novemsky et al. 2007; Alter and Oppenheimer 2009 ). Kadous, Krische and Sedor (2006) show that analyst optimism is reduced when analysts are asked to generate few rather than many counter-explanations as to why managers' plans might fail. Drawing on the work of both Heiman (1990) and Koonce (1992) on the use of counter-explanations and Schwarz et al. (1991) on the availability heuristic, Kadous et al. (2006) argue that their results are driven by the fact that analysts find the generation of few counter-explanations to be subjectively easy, but the generation of many counter-explanations to be difficult. This subjective ease (or processing fluency) serves as a heuristic cue affecting judgments. A more recent paper by Koonce and Lipe (2010) also touches on theories of processing fluency, but in a different context. They find that when information about both earnings trend and earnings performance is available, investors react to each measure only when it is consistent over time (e.g. consistently increasing earnings or consistently meeting performance benchmarks). Koonce and Lipe (2010) argue that inconsistent measures are more difficult to process, and are therefore ignored when consistent information is available.
Investors' Perceptions of Managers' Strategic Readability Choices
Stage 2 of my experiment is designed to investigate investors' conscious perceptions about managers' strategic choices of disclosure readability. In Stage 2 of the experiment I emphasize that managers have discretion in their choice of disclosure readability by presenting participants with both the press release that they initially received and the press release containing the same news but at the other level of readability. Participants view the two press releases side-by-side, and are asked to predict which of the two managers are more likely to provide, given the firm's performance.
Results are mixed, especially in small-sample studies, on whether managers provide less readable disclosures when firm performance is poor (Courtis 1986; Jones 1988; Subramanian, Insley and Blackwell 1993; Jones and Shoemaker 1994; Clatworthy and Jones 2001) . In a more recent large-sample study, Li (2008) In a related study, Moffitt and Burns (2009) find that fraudulent 10-K's are less-readable, supporting the idea that managers may strategically hide bad news.
My experiment makes salient the potential for variation in disclosure readability, and investigates whether investors predict that managers will provide disclosures that vary in readability as firm performance varies. Linguistic choices are influenced by a lifetime of experience with language and are driven by fundamental psychological processes (Tausczik and Pennebaker 2010) .
My expectation is that when Stage 2 of my experiment makes salient that there is a potential for variation in disclosure readability, participants correctly infer that low readability disclosures will be more difficult to process. In turn, I expect them to believe that managers will use this to their advantage and choose disclosures that are more readable when news is good than when news is bad.
My fourth hypothesis is:
H4: When the potential for variation in disclosure readability is made salient, investors predict that managers are likely to provide more readable disclosures when performance is good than when performance is bad.
III. Experiment Participants
Participants are 234 individuals recruited from Amazon's Mechanical Turk platform.
Launched in 2005, Amazon's Mechanical Turk (AMT) is an internet labor market that allows "Requesters" to pay individuals to complete "Human Intelligence Tasks" (HITs). AMT is an increasingly popular source of experimental data for social scientists because the AMT subject pool is large, readily accessible, and at least as representative of the U.S. population as more traditional subject pools (Paolacci, Chandler and Ipeirotis 2010) . Furthermore, studies run on AMT have been shown to reliably replicate a wide range of prior JDM findings (Paolacci et al. 2010; Horton, Rand and Zeckhauser 2010).
Libby, Bloomfield and Nelson (2002) suggest that the appropriateness of a particular group of participants can be judged based on whether their knowledge is sufficient for the task. I specifically recruit participants who (1) live in the United States and (2) consider English to be their native language. This particular sample of participants should have sufficient knowledge to act as small investors, read a press release and provide simple judgments of a firm and its management.
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My focus on small investors is appropriate because Miller (2010) and Loughran and McDonald (2010) find that small (but not large) investors are influenced by the readability of disclosures.
Furthermore, the SEC plain English guidelines emphasize that clear writing is primarily intended to assist the "least-sophisticated investors" (SEC 1998).
The average participant is 34.13 years old, with an average of 13.29 years of full-time work experience. Participants have completed an average of 1.23 accounting and 1.12 finance courses.
Overall, 89.74% of participants indicate that they have at least some experience with investing, with 45.73% saying that they have invested in individual stocks in the past and 66.24% saying that they plan on investing in individual stocks in the future.
8 Figure 1 presents the sources that participants indicate using for their investment information. The most common source of investment information (with 43.59% of participants indicating it as a source) is companies' own websites. This suggests that companies may have a substantial amount of control over the presentation of at least some of the information that is accessed by the investing public.
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>
Design
My experiment uses a 2x2 between-subjects design manipulating whether an abbreviated press release for a fictitious soft drink company (1) conveys good or bad news about the firm, and (2) is more or less readable (see Figure 2 , Panel A). The experiment is conducted in two stages (see participants have access to the initial press release but also receive another press release (conveying the same news), but at the other level of disclosure readability. They are told to consider this second press release as an alternative way in which the firm could have presented the information, making salient the potential for managerial discretion in disclosure readability.
<INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>

Manipulations
Materials are adapted from those of a real soft drink company (Jones Soda) but are disguised in order to ensure that participants respond to my experimental materials rather than to other factors (for example, the reputation of the actual firm). To manipulate news I hold revenue and net profit for the firm constant, but change performance in the same quarter for the prior year to alter whether the current quarter represents better (good news) or worse (bad news) performance. I also change the language in the disclosure where appropriate, so that the good news (bad news) disclosures discuss increases (decreases) in performance for the quarter and expectations of further improvement (deterioration) for the upcoming quarter and annual results. Panels A and B of Appendix B provide examples of the abbreviated press releases provided in my more readable conditions for good and bad news, respectively. Appendix C provides similar examples for my less readable conditions.
Task and Procedure
In Stage 1 of my experiment, participants begin by reading basic background information about the company and providing an initial judgment about the appropriate common stock valuation for the firm. Following initial valuation judgments, participants are presented with the abbreviated press release that contains my manipulations (Appendices B and C). After participants review the press release, I ask them to indicate once again their beliefs about the appropriate common stock valuation of the firm, as well as provide their ratings of management competence and trustworthiness (the two components of credibility).
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After answering questions about firm valuation and management credibility, participants indicate the extent to which they felt that they could rely on the information in the press release and also provide ratings of disclosure readability to capture processing fluency. Again, H2 predicts that a more readable disclosure will lead to higher ratings of processing fluency which, in turn, will increase participants' beliefs that they can rely on the information in the disclosure. Participants conclude Stage 1 of my task by answering three questions of recall. These are designed to rule out that differences in participants' responses are due to differences in information acquisition rather than differences in subjective perceptions associated with information processing.
In Stage 2 of my experiment, participants are told that they will also be asked to consider
another press release that management could have provided (in addition to the one that they initially received). The second press release that they receive contains the same news (i.e. good or bad), but is presented at the other level of readability. This presentation is intended to make salient to participants that managers can vary the level of readability in their disclosures. To reinforce the difference between the two press releases and increase the likelihood that participants carefully examine them, participants rate the extent to which the actual information in the two disclosures is identical, and also rate which of the two disclosures is more readable. Participants are then asked to indicate the extent to which they think management is more likely to choose one press release versus the other if the goal is to elicit a favorable reaction from the market. My hypothesis in H4 is that participants will predict that managers are more likely to choose the disclosure that is more readable when firm performance is good than when firm performance is bad.
In release" (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). However, I also investigate a measure that should reflect reliance, although it is likely to be a noisier proxy. My second measure of reliance is the absolute value of the change in valuation judgments discussed above. Greater reliance should be reflected as a larger value on this measure. I use both of these measures to provide evidence on H2.
Processing Fluency. To measure processing fluency, participants are asked how easy or difficult it felt to read the press release that they received (1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy). My measure therefore captures participants' subjective feelings, and this measure serves as the mediating variable in my process analysis related to H2 (Oppenheimer 2006) . release that is more readable. Participants' predictions on this scale are used to test H4.
Management
IV. Results
Effects of Readability on Valuation Judgments
My expectation from H1 is that more readable disclosures lead to more positive changes in valuation judgments when news is good, but more negative changes in valuation judgments when news is bad. Descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations and medians) are presented in Panel A
of As expected, I find support for my predicted interaction (p<0.001, one-tailed). Figure 3 presents the plot of the interaction between news and readability. I also confirm that readability has the predicted effect for both good and bad news by conducting tests of simple main effects. Panel C of Table 1 shows that when news is good (bad), a more readable disclosure leads to significantly more positive (negative) changes in valuation judgments (p=0.012 and 0.046, respectively, both one-tailed).
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11 Throughout Section IV, results are presented based on 234 participants. Originally 250 participants were recruited. However, 23 additional participants began the study through the link in AMT but did not finish. Of these 23, 8 were in the good news condition and 15 were in the bad news condition. Thus, attrition was marginally significantly higher for participants randomly assigned to bad news than good news press releases (p=0.061, onetailed). Importantly, attrition was not significantly different between the more and less readable conditions (p=0.392, one-tailed). Of the 250 participants that did complete the task through AMT, 15 erroneously participated even though they were not native English speakers, as requested in my recruiting materials. One additional participant is excluded because a glitch in the Qualtrics software used to administer the task failed to show the page containing my manipulated press release. 12 The interaction of news with readability is also significant without planned contrast weights (p=0.003, one-tailed), or with alternative contrast weights reflecting the (1) main effect of news and (2) the predicted interaction. 13 The normality assumption is violated in three of the four cells of my design for the variable capturing changes in valuation, but my large sample size (n>54 in each treatment) suggests that parametric tests are robust to this deviation from the normality assumption (Scheffé 1959) . Furthermore, performing Levene's test fails to reject the assumption of homogeneity of variance (p=0.579). Therefore, for my analyses of changes in valuation judgments I focus on means and perform parametric tests. However, inferences are the same when I use the nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test. When news is good, a more readable disclosure leads to significantly more positive <INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE> To verify that the stronger reactions to more readable disclosures are not driven by differences in information acquisition, participants respond to three multiple-choice recall questions.
These questions are designed to be somewhat difficult in order to ensure that differences in information acquisition can be detected. I ask them to recall (1) by how much the firm's revenues changed in the quarter, compared to the same quarter in the prior year, (2) whether the CEO expected deteriorating, improving, or steady performance in the upcoming quarter and annual results, and (3) the two countries in which the firm primarily operates. The first two questions are designed to detect whether participants have acquired information about the firm's past performance and future expectations, both of which may be particularly relevant to making valuation judgments. The last question is designed to detect whether they attended to the detailed information about the firm. There are no significant differences in the overall proportion of responses that are correct across the four conditions (p=0.539, two-tailed). This supports the claim that a more readable disclosure does not lead to greater information acquisition in my experiment, and therefore suggests that reactions to actual differences in participants' information are not driving my results. For the first two questions, the proportion of participants answering correctly is 73.93% and 82.91%, respectively. For the last question, 98.72% of participants correctly identify at least one of the two countries in which the firm operates, while 84.19% successfully identify both countries.
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Effects of Readability on Processing Fluency and Reliance on a Disclosure
H2 predicts that more readable will increase feelings of processing fluency and, in turn, increase investors' beliefs that they can rely on the disclosure. As discussed in Section III, I measure changes in valuation judgments (Z=2.33, p=0.010, one-tailed). When news is bad, a more readable disclosure leads to significantly more negative changes in valuation judgments (Z=1.86, p=0.031, one-tailed). 14 For the individual questions, the only difference detected is that participants are more likely to answer the second question correctly with a more readable disclosure. However, this difference only occurs for bad news (p=0.036, one-tailed) rather than good news (p=0.481, one-tailed), so it cannot explain the good news results. Furthermore, if I analyze only those participants that answer the second question correctly, my contrast testing H1 is still significant (p<0.001), as are the main effects for good news (p=0.021, one-tailed) and bad news (p=0.020, one-tailed).
reliance in two ways. Panel A of Table 2 summarizes results of a mediation analysis using my first measure of reliance. The mediation analysis is conducted according to the 4-step procedure specified by Baron and Kenny (1986) . In this analysis, the dependent variable is participants' agreement with the statement "I felt like I could rely on the information in the press release" (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). With respect to Step 1, readability is significantly positively associated with participants' beliefs that they can rely on the press release (p=0.039, one-tailed).
Step 2 confirms that readability is significantly positively associated with participants' perceptions of processing fluency (p<0.001, one-tailed).
Step 3 confirms that the mediating variable, processing fluency, is significantly associated with participants' reliance on the press release, even after controlling for readability (p<0.001, one-tailed). Finally, Step 4 confirms that processing fluency fully mediates the relationship between readability and participants' beliefs that they can rely on the press release, as the effect of readability on reliance is no longer significant when included in the model with processing fluency (p=0.431, one-tailed). Table 2 presents the mediation analysis for H2 with a different measure of reliance as the dependent variable: the unsigned measure capturing the change in valuation judgments. While noisier than a direct measure of reliance, the unsigned measure reflects that changes in valuation judgments should be larger (as demonstrated in H1) if reliance on a disclosure is greater.
Panel B of
Step 1 confirms that readability is significantly positively associated with participants' reliance on the press release (p<0.001, one-tailed).
Step 2 again confirms that readability is significantly positively associated with participants' perceptions of processing fluency (p<0.001, one-tailed).
Step 3 confirms that processing fluency is significantly associated with participants' reliance on the press release, after controlling for disclosure readability (p=0.016, one-tailed).
Finally, Step 4 supports partial mediation. Readability is still significant, but the significance is reduced when processing fluency is included in the regression (<0.001 to 0.003). I use the Sobel test to confirm that the direct effect is reduced between Steps 1 and 4 (that is, once the mediator is included (p=0.032, one-tailed)). Results in Table 2 support H2 and show that a more readable disclosure increases participants' perceptions that they can rely on the information in the disclosure, as a result of increased processing fluency.
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>
Effects of Readability on Judgments of Management Credibility
To test H3, I begin by confirming that the trustworthiness and competence responses represent the same underlying credibility construct by performing a reliability analysis. The resulting
Cronbach's alpha is 0.78, which exceeds the recommended threshold of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978) .
Therefore, I combine participants' judgments of management trustworthiness and competence into one management credibility measure by averaging the two responses. Panel A of Table 3 presents descriptive statistics (i.e. means, standard deviations and medians) for the credibility measure. Panel B presents results of two-sample t-tests of the main effect of readability on credibility. However, the effect is not significant for the full sample (p=0.299, one-tailed) or in either the good news (p=0.141, one-tailed) or bad news (p=0.469, one-tailed) subsamples.
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Thus, the direct effect predicted in H3 is not supported, and press releases that are more readable do not directly lead to higher ratings of management credibility. Furthermore, there are no direct effects of readability on either the management competence or management trustworthiness judgments when analyzed separately.
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> I do find some evidence that readability has an indirect effect on management credibility through its influence on processing fluency. Hayes (2009) cautions that failure to test for an indirect effect in the absence of a direct effect may cause researchers to miss "potentially interesting, 15 The normality assumption is violated in the less readable good news condition for my management credibility measure, but my large sample size (n>54 in each treatment) suggests that parametric tests are robust to this deviation from the normality assumption (Scheffé 1959 
Investors' Perceptions of Managers' Disclosure Choices
H4 predicts that when the potential for variation in disclosure readability is made salient, participants predict that managers are more likely to provide more readable disclosures when performance is good than when performance is bad. For testing this hypothesis, Stage 2 of my experiment presents participants simultaneously with both the more and less readable press releases for their performance condition (good or bad).
As shown in Panel A of Table 4 , results support H4. Participants predict that managers will provide a more readable disclosure in the good news condition than in the bad news condition (p<0.001, one-tailed).
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In response to a more general question on managers' disclosure choices,
Panel B of Table 4 shows that participants believe that when a firm is performing well (poorly), 16 Mathieu and Taylor (2006) discuss the distinction between a mediator and an intervening variable. 17 For example, more readable bad news may lead to lower credibility assessments through an alternative indirect path, offsetting the positive effects of fluency and canceling out the direct effect, should it exist. 18 Inferences on H4 are identical if I instead conduct a nonparametric Wilcoxon Rank Sum test on participants' median responses (p<0.001, one-tailed). When participants are asked to indicate their agreement with the statement that the actual information in the two disclosures is identical (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), the mean response is significantly above the midpoint (p<0.001, one-tailed), indicating their agreement.
managers will intentionally make information easier (more difficult) to understand (p<0.001 for both judgments, one-tailed).
<INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>
Additional Analyses
Stage 2 p=0.970, untabulated) . This suggests that the stronger reactions to more readable disclosures found in H1 may be unintentional (Kahneman and Tversky 1996; Tan, Libby, and Hunton 2002) .
This is also consistent with findings in psychology showing that people are not affected by processing fluency once they realize its source (Schwarz 2004; Alter and Oppenheimer 2009 ).
Alternatively, changes in valuation judgments between Stage 1 and Stage 2 may be due to participants' considerations about the strategic disclosure behavior of managers.
I also find that participants in both the less readable/bad news and more readable/good news conditions provide significantly lower credibility judgments in Stage 2 of my experiment than in Stage 1 (p=0.019 and p<0.001, one-tailed, respectively, untabulated). In combination with results discussed above about investors' perceptions of managers' strategic choices, these results are consistent with the idea that investors perceive managers as being less credible when they attempt to obfuscate bad news but present good news clearly, so long as investors consider that managers could have made alternative disclosure choices.
V. Conclusion
Recent work in the archival accounting literature investigates disclosure readability (Li 2008; You and Zhang 2009 ) and its effects on the behavior of small investors (Miller 2010; Loughran and McDonald 2010) . I use a controlled experiment to provide complementary evidence and to address questions that cannot be answered with archival data. In Stage 1 of my experiment, participants receive a single press release. I find that, holding constant length and information content, more readable disclosures lead to stronger reactions from investors, so that changes in investors' valuation judgments are more positive when news is good and more negative when news is bad. Consistent with prior literature in psychology, I find that participants are more likely to feel as though they can rely on a disclosure that is more readable, and that this effect is mediated by processing fluency. This greater reliance on news (be it good or bad) helps to explain the stronger reactions to more readable disclosures that I observe, despite the fact that that readability does not lead to significant differences in the actual information that participants are able to gather from the press release. Counter to my predictions, I do not find that disclosure readability directly affects perceptions of management credibility. Untabulated results indicate that there is an indirect effect of readability on credibility, and that it operates through perceptions of processing fluency. A significant indirect effect in the absence of a direct effect suggests that the effect of readability on credibility may be too small to detect without a larger sample size (Shrout and Bolger 2002) , or that there may be an offsetting indirect effect that works in the opposite direction of processing fluency (MacKinnon, Krull and Lockwood 2000) . Future work might investigate whether fluency has a more direct effect on managers' credibility when there is greater overlap between the message and the messenger (for example, in a conference call where the manager is delivering the message).
In Stage 2 of my experiment, I present participants with both the more and less readable press releases for a given piece of news (good or bad). The press releases are presented side-by-side, which makes it salient to participants that disclosures can differ in their readability. I then capture participants' predictions about managers' disclosure choices as performance varies. I find that participants predict that managers will intentionally choose a press release that is more readable when firm performance is good than when performance is bad. Consistent with the idea that participants view this to be strategic obfuscation, I find that participants who initially received a more readable good news press release or a less readable bad news press release (in Stage 1 of the experiment) provide lower credibility judgments in Stage 2. I also find that participants in the more readable disclosure conditions provide valuation judgments in Stage 2 that are less extreme than the valuation judgments they provide in Stage 1, to the point where the effect of readability on investors' reactions is no longer significant. These results suggest that the stronger reactions in response to more readable disclosures in Stage 1 of my experiment may have been unintentional (Kahneman and Tversky 1996; Tan, Libby and Hunton 2002) . This is consistent with prior research showing that individuals do not treat processing fluency as a cue in their judgments once they realize its source (Schwarz 2004; Alter and Oppenheimer 2009 ). However, it is also possible that the different pattern in valuation judgments in Stage 2 is in response to participants' considerations about managers' strategic behavior rather than awareness of the effects of processing fluency. Future work could potentially disentangle these two explanations.
My findings add to the growing body of literature investigating the style of disclosures as opposed to content. Content is the literal meaning of the information conveyed, or the concrete facts contained in a disclosure, whereas style captures the methods used to convey meaning to the audience. In response to Core's (2001) A limitation of my study is that it is not clear whether investors' reactions differ in response to individual linguistic and formatting choices. I made this design choice to produce a strong treatment effect. My treatments also correspond with real-world disclosures, because the use of either high-or low-quality linguistic and formatting features is likely to be highly correlated in a given disclosure (Loughran and McDonald 2010) . However, there is substantial opportunity for future experimental research investigating how individual stylistic features of a disclosure affect investors'
judgments. Experiments are also likely to be well-suited to the investigation of managers' disclosure decisions (to investors, but also to auditors, other employees, clients, etc.). Sociolinguistics research supports the prediction that choice of linguistic characteristics may vary in line with specific goals and incentives.
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Based on these findings, future work might investigate whether managers (intentionally or unintentionally) use personal pronouns and other linguistic features to influence others' reactions as firm performance and incentives vary (Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007; Li 2010b ).
My study also adds to the literature on processing fluency, and suggests that it may be an important mechanism for both understanding results in prior studies and motivating predictions in knowledge structures to complete a task (Schwarz 2004) . Findings in Hopkins (1996) can perhaps then be thought of as evidence that financial statement classification affects conceptual processing fluency by making category-relevant information more or less accessible.
The effects of processing fluency also represent a potentially fruitful opportunity for future research. For instance, the use of "jargon" is likely to feel more fluent to those with more experience in financial reporting settings, suggesting important experience effects of processing fluency.
Furthermore, processing fluency research might also suggest potential remedies for biased decisionmaking in accounting settings. Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley and Eyre (2007) show that in some circumstances disfluent presentation can lead to more systematic processing, presumably because disfluency can act as a signal that greater effort should be expended on the task. This suggests that processing fluency could be manipulated in a variety of ways to induce relatively more cautious or aggressive behavior among managers, investors, auditors, etc. Stephen Miller, Chief Executive Officer, stated, "Sales were above plan, earnings were higher than expectations, the Company engaged in the execution of several initiatives during the third quarter that have it better positioned for the future, and the Company's business strategy is to increase sales by expanding distribution of its brands in new and existing markets, which is intended to raise consumer awareness and trial of its products, thus leading to increased relevance and purchase intent."
Chief Executive Officer, Stephen Miller, stated, "Our sales were above plan, our earnings were higher than we expected, and we executed several initiatives during the third quarter that have us better positioned for the future. Our business strategy is to increase sales by expanding distribution of our brands in new and existing markets, raising consumer awareness and trial of our products, and increasing relevance and purchase intent."
Active Voice …which is intended to raise consumer awareness and trial of our products, thus leading to increased relevance and purchase intent.
…raising consumer awareness and trial of our products, and increasing relevance and purchase intent.
No Hidden Verbs
While sales were below plan and earnings were lower than expectations, the Company engaged in the execution of several initiatives during the third quarter that have it better positioned for the future… While sales were below plan and earnings were lower than expected, we executed several initiatives during the third quarter that have us better positioned for the future…
No Superfluous Words
The decrease in revenue was primarily because of the fact that there was a decrease in total case sales of 34.5 percent to 2.9 million cases.
The decrease in revenue was primarily due to a decrease in total case sales of 34.5% to 2.9 million cases.
Write in the Positive
The 
Simple Synonyms
The Company is focused on escalating distribution of its products, building and maintaining good relationships with key distributors; and creating pioneering brands of beverages and products.
The Company is focused on expanding distribution of its products, building and maintaining good relationships with key distributors; and creating innovative brands of beverages and products.
Personal Pronouns
The recent strength of the overall economy and financial markets has positively impacted the Company's two primary markets: the U.S. and Canada. This has not decreased consumer confidence in the economy and the Company believes has positively affected consumers' willingness to purchase its products as they augment discretionary spending.
The recent strength of the overall economy and financial markets has positively impacted our two primary markets: the U.S. and Canada. This has increased consumer confidence in the economy and we believe has positively affected consumers' willingness to purchase our products as they grow their discretionary spending.
Keep SubjectVerb-and Object in order and together. 
Readability Condition Change in Valuation Judgments
Good News Bad News
This figure plots means, by condition, for the measure used in my experiment to capture changes in investors' valuation judgments after viewing a disclosure. The experiment manipulates whether a press release contains (1) good or bad news and is (2) more or less readable. 234 participants provide valuation judgments both before and after receiving the press release containing my manipulations (on a 101-point scale (0=low, 100=high)). The measure in my analysis is the difference between these two judgments, which captures the strength of investors' reactions to the disclosure. 
Readability
This table presents descriptive statistics, contrast-coded ANOVA, and simple main effects tests for the measure used in my experiment to capture changes in investors' valuation judgments after viewing a disclosure. The experiment manipulates whether a press release contains (1) good or bad news and is (2) more or less readable. 234 participants provide valuation judgments both before and after receiving the press release containing my manipulations (on a 101-point scale (0=low, 100=high)). The measure in my analyses is the difference between these two judgments, which captures the strength of investors' reactions to the disclosure. The cells of the experiment receive contrast weights as follows: Good News/More Readable = +3, Bad News/More Readable = -3, Good News/Less Readable = +2, Bad News/Less Readable = -2. All p-values are one-tailed. Step 1: IV effect on DV
Step 2: IV effect on Mediator (MV)
Step 4: IV effect on DV once MV is included
Step 3: MV effect on DV, controlling for IV 4.628 (0.016) 7.867 (0.003) F-Value (p-value)
Step 1: IV effect on DV
Step 3: MV effect on DV, controlling for IV
This table summarizes tests of the mediating role of processing fluency between disclosure readability and participants' reliance on the disclosure. Panel A presents results of the mediation analysis where the dependent variable is participants' agreement with the statement "I felt like I could rely on the disclosure" (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Panel B presents results of the mediation analysis with unsigned change in valuation judgments as the dependent variable. The former measure is a direct question of their beliefs about whether they can rely on the press release. The latter measure is a judgment that should reflect reliance. To measure processing fluency, participants are asked how easy or difficult it was to read the press release that they received (1 = very difficult, 7 = very easy). Panel A presents descriptive statistics on the credibility measure in my experiment, in which 234 participants read a press release and provide associated competence and trustworthiness judgments on a 101-point scale (0=low, 100=high). Credibility is measured as the average of the Trustworthiness and Competence judgments after Cronbach's alpha confirms that the two measures are capturing the same underlying construct. Panel B presents results for testing the effects of readability on credibility in the full sample as well as the good and bad news subsamples. The actual materials that participants receive do not label either press release as "more readable" or "less readable". Rather, participants are just presented with each and are able to draw their own inferences about disclosure readability. The "less readable" and "more readable" labels used in this table are for ease of exposition in explaining my results.
Scale (7) †
Mean Response (Standard Deviation)
Participants are presented with both the high and low readability press release for their news condition (i.e. good or bad). I ask them to indicate which of the two press releases managers would choose to provide if their goal is to have the market react as favorably as possible to the news. Responses are collected on a slider scale indicating that management is either (0) much more likely to choose Press Release A or (7) much more likely to choose Press Release B, where Press Release A is shown as the one that they initially received in Stage 1 of the experiment, and Press Release B is the alternative presentation. For those in the high readability condition I reverse-code responses so that higher values in my analyses indicate a preference for the press release that is higher in readability. Participants indicate their responses to general questions regarding managers' choices as performance varies. A response value of 3.5 indicates a neutral response. T-statistics marked with a *,**, or *** indicate a p-value of <0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, two-tailed, respectively, when testing whether the mean response is significantly different from a neutral value of 3.5. All inferences are identical with nonparametric tests of the median. 
